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Abstract 
Labels shape and define public discourse. As condensational symbols, they can 
serve as political tools and instruments of policy due to the media’s tendency to use 
labels to create meaning and knowledge about political and social reality. This study 
examines the politics of labelling through a case study of the representation of Boko 
Haram in a selection of Nigerian national newspapers. Boko Haram, a transnational 
terrorist organisation responsible for the death of over 20,000 Nigerians and the 
displacement of more than two million people, has been a major threat to the 
Nigerian state for almost a decade. Although it was originally perceived to be a 
domestic problem, its reach across national boundaries has extended its impact 
beyond Nigeria and it has now been recognised as an international threat. This 
paper explores how labels used to frame this group in the Nigerian press echo geo-
ethno polarities embedded in Nigerian politics. The study investigates the 
representations of Boko Haram to evaluate how the narrative about the sect has 
been constructed. It reveals that the dominant voices prefer labels such as terrorists 
and insurgents, which reflect popular understanding of the sect. Through a content 
analysis of a selection of national news stories, the study argues that the nature of 
Nigerian politics and media ecology plays a critical role in the media framing of Boko 
Haram.  
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Introduction 
In December 2011, a sub-committee of the United States House of Representatives 
Committee on Homeland Security issued a report that identified Boko Haram as an 
‘emerging threat to the U.S. Homeland’. The report designated Boko Haram as ‘an 
Islamist religious sect turned insurgent group based in the predominantly Muslim 
northern Nigeria’ and underlined the group’s ‘potential to commit acts of terrorism 
against U.S. interests and the U.S. homeland’ (Committee on Homeland Security 
report, 2011:5). In addition, the subcommittee recommended ‘an investigation into 
whether Boko Haram should be categorised as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation’ 
(FTO) and argued that identifying the group as a FTO would empower the United 
States intelligence and law enforcements communities to ensure the group ‘does not 
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attack US interests and the US mainland’ (Committee on Homeland Security report, 
2011:3).  
 
Using the Homeland Security Committee’s report as a point of departure, this study 
examines labels used by different actors in the framing of Boko Haram in a selection 
of Nigerian national newspapers. It explores how the selected newspapers 
constructed narratives about Boko Haram through the use of labels provided by 
political actors and the publications themselves. We argue that popular labels used 
in the Boko Haram discourse such as insurgents and criminals serve as foci that 
evoke particular understanding of the group.  Furthermore, by identifying both labels 
and political actors who use them in newspaper narratives about Boko Haram, a 
group whose activities threaten the existence of the Nigerian state, the study 
highlights the power relations embedded in the politics of labelling.  
 
Boko Haram: What’s in a name? 
Boko Haram is a transnational terrorist organisation that has been a major threat to 
the Nigerian state for almost a decade. It has been accused of being responsible for 
the death of over 20,000 Nigerians and the displacement of more than two million 
people. As the 2011 US Homeland Security Committee’s report states, ‘the origins of 
Boko Haram are murky’. Some commentators suggest it has been in existence since 
the late 1990s or early 2000s. Andrew Walker, a freelance journalist with extensive 
experience of covering Nigeria, associates Boko Haram with a radical Islamist group 
that was formed in 2002 in Maiduguri, in north-eastern Nigeria. The group initially 
emerged as a social welfare and educational support project that provided a safety 
net for members of its community. It filled a vacuum created by an absent state that 
had failed to meets its social responsibilities to citizens (Walker, 2012). Farouk 
Chothia, writing for the BBC African Service, noted that the group ran an Islamic 
school that catered for children from ‘many poor Muslim families from across Nigeria’ 
(Chothia, 2016). However, over time, the group transmuted into an extremist 
organisation and has now expanded beyond north-eastern Nigeria into neighbouring 
countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger.  Its trajectory of violence includes spates of 
violent attacks against security forces, and civilians in parts of northern Nigeria; the 
bombing of the UN House, Abuja, in 2011; the kidnapping in 2014 of almost 300 girls 
from a secondary school in Chibok, north-eastern Nigeria, and numerous other acts 
of violence. In 2013, Boko Haram was recognised as a terrorist group by the US 
State Department, alongside organisations such as Al Qaeda, Hamas, and the Real 
Irish Republican Army (Labott and Botelho, 2013). 
 
The evolution of a non-violent community support group into an extremist 
organisation that uses violence as a strategy to propagate an Islamic ideology and 
destabilise Nigeria has been attributed to a variety of factors. The US Homeland 
Security Committee’s report, for example, suggested that the emergence of a radical 
Islamic group in Nigeria was a product of ‘a feeling of alienation from the wealthier, 
Christian, oil-producing, southern Nigeria, pervasive poverty, rampant government 
corruption, heavy-handed security measures, and the belief that relations with the 
West are a corrupting influence’ (US Homeland Security Committee Report, 2011:6). 
Jean Herskovits, a professor of history at the State University of New York, asserts 
that Boko Haram was a peaceful Islamic splinter group when it emerged in 2002 but 
became radical when ‘politicians began exploiting it for electoral purposes’ 
(Herskovits, 2012).  
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The mutation of Boko Haram can also be seen as a direct product of the decadent 
nature of governance in Nigeria, championed by self-seeking prebendalists, and 
evidenced in the high incidence of corruption and ever-increasing poverty rate.  
William Hansen argues, for instance, that ‘the Boko Haram phenomenon…can only 
be understood as a reaction to more than a half century of corruption, venality, 
poverty, and abuse by the state predator class’ (Hansen 2017:552). This view is 
echoed by Paul Rogers, a global security expert. In a briefing for the Oxford 
Research Group, Rogers attributes the growth of Boko Haram to three specific 
factors: ‘the relative economic neglect of the Moslem north, a country-wide issue of 
very serious divisions of wealth and poverty (in spite of the oil wealth of the Delta), 
and an endemic problem of corruption, especially within the political system’ 
(Rogers, 2012:2). Other authors have pointed to factors such as identity conflict 
arising from Nigeria’s complex multi-religious/ethnic composition (Loimeier. 2012; 
Oyeniyi, 2014), modernisation strain (Idowu, 2013), and increase in rent-seeking 
behaviours (Gourley, 2012), as possible causes of the campaign of violence by Boko 
Haram.   
 
Prior to its evolution into a terrorist organisation, Boko Haram’s activities were 
perceived to be a localised problem and largely ignored by Nigerian authorities. 
However, in 2009 it embarked on a campaign of violence against security forces 
during which its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was captured and, according to John 
Campbell, a former United States ambassador to Nigeria, murdered by the Nigerian 
army (Campbell, 2011). Contrary to expectations that Yusuf’s death would curb the 
growth of the group, it appears that it marked a turning point for Boko Haram. 
Onapajo and Uzodike, (2012:24-25), for example, argue that ‘the government’s 
mishandling of the group’s terrorist activities by the summary execution of its leader, 
Mohammed Yusuf, and the arrant use of force on its members, intensified the 
belligerence of the Boko Haram group’. After a short period of inactivity, following 
Yusuf’s death, the group re-emerged more radical and embarked on a mission to 
propagate an Islamic ideology through a campaign of violence against the Nigerian 
state.  
 
Officially known as Jama’atu Ahlissunnah Iidda’awati wal Jihad, meaning ‘people 
committed to the propagation of the prophet’s teachings and Jihad’, the group’s best 
known label, ‘Boko Haram’, implies ‘Western education is sacrilege’ in the Hausa 
language, the most widely spoken language in northern Nigeria. The label reflects 
the group’s commitment to hard-line Islamic principles and deep-seated hatred of 
Western way of life. The label is a media construct that resonates ‘mainly because 
the public prefers it partly as a way of ridiculing the group and partly because it 
seems to fit into the group’s outward ideological outlook’ (Abubakar (2012:98). The 
group, however, has challenged this view, and blames what it refers to as ‘the infidel 
media’ for popularising the label. Boko Haram, a spokesperson for the group said, 
does not mean “Western Education is a sin” rather:  
 
Boko Haram actually means 'Western Civilisation' is forbidden. The difference 
is that while the first [Boko Haram] gives the impression that we are opposed 
to formal education coming from the West…which is not true, the second 
affirms our belief in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not Education), for 
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culture is broader, it includes education but not determined by Western 
Education (Onuoha, 2012:2). 
 
It is worth noting that the label Boko Haram has become so entrenched in public 
discourse that even the sect’s representative, while disputing the title, used   the 
label instead of the group’s official name. The explanation confirms the view that the 
group’s ideological position goes beyond opposition to Western way of life but as 
Weeraratne (2017:612) argues, it also ‘calls for the destruction of modern political, 
social and economic institution… and on the application of Sharia law….’ Their 
application of violent techniques such as kidnappings, beheadings, and suicide 
bombings, including the use of improvised explosive devices and vehicle-borne 
improvised devices on both military and civilian targets are, therefore, in pursuance 
of these objectives. In sum, the Boko Haram label and other popular tags used in 
narratives about the group convey nuanced messages about the organisation and 
what it stands for. 
 
Boko Haram’s campaign of violence has generated a variety of labels (words and 
phrases) in narratives about the group and these are employed by different political 
actors in their bid to define the organisation, identify its root causes, and/or offer 
probable solutions.  This research seeks to identify key actors in the Boko Haram 
discourse in four Nigerian national newspapers; to identify labels used to describe 
the group in the selected publications, and finally, to map the identified labels to the 
actors who employ them. Our study presupposes that the labels employed can be 
seen as reflections of Nigerian politics, which is marked by geo-ethno-religious 
cleavages and corruption, and also as a manifestation of the complexity of global 
terrorism. 
 
The politics of labelling 
Conventional understanding of labelling focuses on deviancy and how people who 
defy moral boundaries in society are treated as ‘outsiders’ and labelled as ‘deviants’ 
(Becker, 1963).  For the purpose of this study, labelling is understood as ‘an intrinsic 
component of human agency (Moncrieff and Eyben, 2007:20) and labels are 
understood as artefacts embedded in public discourse. Labelling, as Monccrieff and 
Eyben argue, involves ‘insidious dimensions of power, where authoritative ‘scientific’ 
technique’ can be used to depoliticise political processes (2007:19). Although their 
focus was in relation to welfare claims, their arguments are pertinent and applicable 
to other contexts of labelling. From this perspective, labelling can be seen as a 
negotiated political process driven by power because it reinforces political power 
structures. For instance, ‘widespread use of subjective and vague terminology’ could 
influence public perception, opinion and policy (Sexton, 2017:35).  Put differently, 
some sets of actors can exercise power by imposing labels on situations and people 
in ways that can have significant implications. Labels can, therefore, be wielded as a 
weapon of power by political actors, and used as a means of legitimising or 
delegitimising other invested actors, thereby serving as a tool in the othering 
process. 
 
Labels, in this study, refer to specific words used by political actors in media 
narratives in reference to Boko Haram. As Entman notes, words used consistently in 
media narratives convey particular meanings over time (Entman, 1991). This study 
adopts the functionality perspective of labelling, which focuses on the understanding 
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that ‘through the labelling process policy makers, willingly or unconsciously, shape 
reality according to their ideology and interest’ (Broek, 2017:122). It is crucial to 
understand that although labels may appear neutral and objective, they are value-
laden. ‘Labels are not simply a number of isolated qualifications. For labels to be 
effective (credible, taken to be reliable reflections of part of reality), they have to form 
part of a chain of rational arguments: the appearance of rationality gives these labels 
the aura of objectivity’ (Broek, 2017:122). Thus, labels have to be seen to be 
strategically chosen and embedded in narratives to convey a particular 
understanding of the discourse in question.  
 
As mediating agents, and through their capacity to interact directly and indirectly with 
the powerful as well as the powerless, the media perform a vital role in the labelling 
process. They can identify and magnify and conversely ignore and downgrade 
certain labels. The power to name is critical because it ascribes an identity to the 
named and subject to the context, it determines the parameters for public perception 
of the named. When labels become acceptable, they legitimise action. By depicting a 
group as a terrorist organisation, those who have the power to name reconstruct the 
group’s identity and convey a particular message about it. Labels do not just 
describe things, they make a judgement. This is particularly pertinent in the analysis 
of media framing of terrorism. A Martha Crenshaw noted: 
 
It is clear from surveying the literature of terrorism, as well as the public 
debate, that what one calls things matters. There are few neutral terms in 
politics, because political language affects the perceptions of protagonists and 
audiences, and such effect acquires a greater urgency in the drama of 
terrorism. Similarly, the meanings of the terms change to fit a changing 
context (Crenhaw, 1995:7). 
 
Labelling can, as a result, systematically direct attention to specific acts and identity 
markers. In this context, labels used by self-validating sources such as government 
spokespersons and even the media constitute highly rated information. For example, 
when the US House of Representatives Subcommittee labelled Boko Haram a 
terrorist group, media outlets reported the labelling without further obvious attempts 
to confirm the assertion. As primary definers, the politicians established the 
parameters for further discussion of the group and its potentials to attack the US 
interests and mainland. The labels utilised by members of the Committee legitimised 
and reinforced their recommendations and official positions on how best to tackle the 
Boko Haram problem. Against this backdrop, the mass media serve a ‘hegemonic 
function in manufacturing public consent for counterterrorism policy and official 
frames for terrorism discourse by preferential disclosure of official information and 
agendas at the expense of other perspectives’ (Crelinsten, 1989:320).  
 
METHODOLOGY 
This study employs a qualitative content analysis of data extracted from four national 
newspapers in Nigeria: The Guardian, The Punch, Daily Trust, and Leadership. The 
papers were selected to reflect the Nigerian press ecology, which is dominated by two 
publishing hubs in the north and south.  The Guardian newspaper, which is regarded 
as Nigeria’s flagship/elitist newspaper, and The Punch, which is deemed to be the 
most widely read newspaper in the country are published in the southern hub while 
the Daily Trust and Leadership newspapers are published in the northern hub. In 
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addition, these two publications are widely circulated in the northern part of the 
country, and are regarded as ‘the voice of the north’.  The inclusion of papers from 
different parts of the country allowed for a balanced view of the coverage, while the 
overall combined coverage by the selected newspapers ensured a robust account of 
the key actors and labels utilised in discussions about Boko Haram. 
 
The study set out to answer three key questions:  
a. Who are the key political actors in the Boko Haram discourse in the selected 
national newspapers? 
b. What were the dominant labels in the coverage of Boko Haram in the selected 
newspapers? 
c. Which labels were utilised by the identified actors?  
The time frame for this study covers the months of January and March 2017.  These 
were selected because there were no major Boko Haram attacks, which could have 
resulted in what-a-story moments, and possibly influenced the results of the study.  
Furthermore, during these months, the country, especially the Federal Government, 
led by President Muhammadu Buhari, and the Nigerian military, was in a celebratory 
mood over gains scored against Boko Haram. In his new year’s speech to the nation, 
the president touted the success of his administration in ousting Boko Haram from 
Sambisa forest, a former game reserve that had been converted into a staging area 
for the sect. This speech triggered debates about the possible demise of Boko Haram, 
and sparked several responses from different political actors.  
 
Data for analysis were mined using the keywords: Boko Haram, ‘B’Haram’, and 
Abubakar Shekau.  B’Haram is an abbreviated term used in all the newspapers to 
represent Boko Haram; and Abubakar Shekau is the factional leader of the group and 
frequently mentioned in reference to the group. A total of 982 articles were identified 
as being relevant for analysis with The Guardian accounting for 279; The Punch 188; 
Daily Trust 236; and Leadership 279 articles. The coding instrument designed for the 
study comprised descriptive and conceptual variables. The descriptive variables 
included the name of the newspaper, date, source/byline of the article, occasion for 
the report, and type of article (news, news analysis, editorial, interview, 
column/opinion, and other) while the conceptual variables consisted of two categories, 
the main actor in the article and the word/phrase used to describe Boko Haram. 
 
Results  
Eighty-five percent of the articles examined across the newspapers were written by 
staff writers or the papers’ own sources.   About sixty percent of the stories in The 
Guardian and The Punch were news stories, while 36% and 44 % of stories in the 
Daily Trust and Leadership newspapers were column/opinion pieces.  Most of the 
stories were reports of counterinsurgency operations embarked upon by the Nigerian 
military.  
 
Research Question One: Actors 
The first research question focused on the identity of key political actors in the 
coverage of Boko Haram by the selected newspapers. Political actors are narrowly 
defined in this article as those individuals or organisations who actively or aspire to 
influence political processes and policies through institutional or organisational 
structures (McNair, 2011). Ten unique categories of actors were identified, and are 
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here listed according to their number of cumulative mentions across the four 
newspapers: The Nigerian military (N=209), the federal government (N=187), political 
figures (N=165), interest groups (N=105), non-partisan figures/religious figures 
(N=96), international organisations (N=69), Boko Haram (N=62), Victims (N=24), 
Academia (N=18), and the Media (N=16).   These results indicate that the Nigerian 
military and the federal government, represented by the president and his appointees, 
were the most powerful voices in the discussion about the group.  Political actors 
clearly identified as belonging to a political party, such as the People’s Democratic 
Party (PDP) or the All Progressives Congress (APC); interest groups such as the Bring 
Back Our Girls (BBOG) group, and other civil rights movements also dominated the 
debate about Boko Haram.  While the military was the most common type of source 
in all news stories, the federal government dominated the coverage of the group by 
the Daily Trust newspaper (N=58).  Given that most of the stories were straight news 
pieces, the media organisations had limited spaces (editorials) to label the group, and 
thus the newspapers emerged as the least active participant.  However, this does not 
necessarily translate to a passive status. 
 
Research Question Two: Labels 
Twenty-four unique labels were identified: “terrorists”, “insurgents”, “Islamists”, 
“militants”, “jihadists”, “Islamist militants/militant Islamists”, “radical Islamists”, “Islamic 
insurgents”, Islamic sect”, “fighters”, “extremist/religious extremist”, “Islamic 
fundamentalists”, “terrorist group/terrorist sect”, “fugitives”, “bandits”, 
“criminals/criminal elements”, “common enemy”, “murderers”, “enemies of the state”, 
“religious bigots”, “rampaging marauders”, “satanic elements”, “hate mongers”, and 
“merchants of death”.  Looking at the table, it is apparent that the labels “terrorist” 
(N=417), and “insurgents” (N=272) were employed more frequently than others.   
 
 
 
 
Table I 
The Guardian The Punch Daily Trust Leadership 
Terrorists (N=256) Insurgents (N=46) Terrorists (N=54) Terrorists (N=72) 
Insurgents (N=138) Terrorists (N=35) Insurgents (N=33) Insurgents (N=55) 
Islamists (N=29) Fighters (N=6) Terrorist 
group/terrorist 
sect (N=7) 
Criminals/criminal 
elements (N=4) 
Militants (N=22) Militants (N=4) Fighters (N=6) Fighters (N=4) 
Jihadists (N=21) Extremists/religious 
extremists (N=2) 
Bandits (N=2) Enemies of the 
state (N=2) 
Islamist militants/ 
militant Islamists 
(N=7) 
Islamic 
fundamentalists 
(N=1) 
Militants (N=2) Religious bigots 
(N=1) 
Islamist extremists 
(N=4) 
Terrorist group 
(N=1) 
Criminals (N=1) Rampaging 
marauders (N=1) 
Radical Islamists 
(N=2) 
Islamists (N=1) Common enemy 
(N=1) 
Terrorist group 
(N=1) 
Islamic insurgents 
(N=1) 
Murderers (N=1) Militants (N=1) 
Islamic sect (N=1) Fugitives (N=1) Islamists (N=1) Bandits (N=1) 
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 Islamic militants 
(N=1) 
Satanic elements 
(N=1) 
   Hate mongers 
(N=1) 
   Merchants of 
death (N=1) 
 
Research Question Three: Labels by actors         
As previously noted, ten categories of political actors were identified in the 
discussion about Boko Haram during the time frame of the study. The Nigerian 
military, the federal government, political figures, and interest groups for the most 
part employed two key labels, “terrorists”, and “insurgents”, in their description of the 
sect.  The international organisations category consists of organisations that are not 
domiciled in Nigeria, and includes bodies like the International Red Cross Society, 
Amnesty International, and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)/Doctors Without 
Borders and international news agencies.  International sources mostly used two 
closely related labels, “Islamists” and “jihadists”.  
 
The category of story sources tagged non-partisan/religious figures include political 
actors who are not clearly affiliated with any political party, and representatives of 
religious groups.  Results from this study showed a marked difference between the 
labels used by this category, especially those affiliated with either Christianity or 
Islam, the dominant religious groups in the country.  For instance, whereas the 
national coordinator of the Muslim Media Watch Group of Nigeria (MMWG), Alhaji 
Ibrahim Abdullahi, described Boko Haram as “satanic elements”; the General 
Secretary of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Dr. Musa Asake, called 
Boko Haram, “an Islamic fundamentalist sect.” 
 
The media category includes the selected national newspapers themselves (The 
Guardian, The Punch, Daily Trust, and Leadership), acting in their capacity as 
political actors. To identify their positions on the issue, this phase of the study 
examined the editorial columns, and stories written by the newspapers’ editors, with 
the objective of locating the labels applied by the newspapers in their narratives 
about the sect.  Overall, there were very few editorials in which Boko Haram was 
clearly labelled during the timeframe of the study. For instance, although the search 
parameters were located in four editorials in the Daily Trust newspaper, no definitive 
labels were used in association with the sect.  Yet, as previously noted in response 
to research question two, most of the political actors named in these newspapers 
applied labels closely associated with crime/criminality.  Regarding the other 
newspapers, findings show that while The Guardian and The Punch utilised the 
labels, “jihadists” and “Islamists” in reference to the sect, Leadership employed the 
phrase “rampaging marauders” in their description of the group. 
 
Although members of the academic community ranked lower in terms of participation 
in the Boko Haram discourse, they applied similar labels as those utilised by the 
dominant political actors. For instance, while speaking at a symposium in Lagos 
State, an annual event held to deliberate on national concerns, Dr. Dele Ashiru of the 
Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, said: ‘Padding had encouraged 
armed bandits to have the effrontery now to challenge the authority of the state. That 
is why we have Boko Haram insurgents, Niger Delta militants, IPOB due to 
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deliberate and criminal neglect of the need of the minorities and the masses by the 
political class (Olumide, 2017, para. 5). The use of the ‘insurgent’ label echoed the 
military’s framing of Boko Haram.  
 
The category that consisted of Boko Haram and Victims, though visible in the 
coverage, were silent in terms of distinctive labelling.  They were recognised as 
actors because Boko Haram engaged in what Rapoport (1977) describes as ‘the 
politics of atrocity’ and the victims, (those who were directly affected by Boko 
Haram’s activities), were directly represented in discussions about the group.  
However, there were no clear cases of labelling on their part. 
 
 
Discussion 
The labels identified in the narratives can be categorised under three broad 
headings: contested, ideological and profit-driven labels. Contested labels include 
‘Terrorist’, ‘terrorist group’, Terrorist sect’, ‘militant’, fighters’ and ‘insurgents’. These 
labels were used mainly by political actors and interest groups. Non-partisan and 
religious actors, international organisations and the media used ideological labels. 
These labels were framed around religion and include ‘Islamists’, ‘jihadists’ and 
‘Islamic fundamentalists’. Profit-driven labels are those that were framed around 
criminality and these were used by the newspapers published in the northern hub 
and political leaders.  
 
To contextualise the lexical choices of the various actors, it is helpful to situate this 
discussion within a wider context of the debate about terrorism and the role of the 
media. Terrorism is a contested concept. As a result, the definitional debate has 
critical consequences on how the media construct knowledge about the subject. 
Richard Jackson, for example, describes terrorism as ‘a highly emotive and divisive 
concept which different scholars and societies have often understood in very 
different ways’ (2008:25). How terrorism is understood in a society has direct bearing 
on how people labelled as terrorists are treated. In Nigeria the ‘Terrorism 
(Prevention) Act, 2011, states that an: 
 
“Act of terrorism” means an act which is deliberately done with malice, 
aforethought and which: may seriously harm or damage a country or an 
international organisation [and] is intended or can reasonably be regarded as 
having been intended to unduly compel a government or international 
organisation to perform or abstain from performing an act (Centre for Laws of 
the Federation of Nigeria).  
 
Other manifestations of acts of terrorism identified in the Act include seriously 
intimidating a population, seriously destabilising or destroying political, constitution, 
economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation, 
intimidation, coercion, kidnapping, destruction to a government or public facility, a 
transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, seizure 
of an aircraft, ship or other means of public or goods transport, the manufacture, 
possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of 
nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development 
of biological and chemical weapons without lawful authority. ‘The release of 
dangerous substance or causing of fire, explosions, or floods, the effect of which is 
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to endanger human life, interference with or disruption of the supply of water, power, 
or any other fundamental natural resource, the effect of which is to endanger human 
life’ (Centre for Laws of the Federation of Nigeria). 
 
This definition is striking in its broadness and to some degree, its vagueness and 
especially in its failure to recognise terrorism as a political concept. As Bruce 
Hoffman, a leading scholar on terrorism, explains, terrorism is ‘fundamentally and 
inherently political. It is also ineluctably about power: the pursuit of power, the 
acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change. Terrorism is 
thus violence - or, equally important, the threat of violence - used and directed in 
pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim’ (Hoffman, 2006:2). The definition of 
terrorist act in the Nigerian context frames out the political undertone of terrorism but 
makes morality salient. Conceptualised as an action informed by malice and 
aforethought, the definition rejects common understanding of terrorism as a 
particular type of violence that is designed to create a climate of extreme fear and 
which is directed at wider audience beyond the immediate victims and often used 
‘primarily, though not exclusively, to influence the political behaviour of governments, 
communities or specific social groups (Wilkinson, 1997:51). Essentially, terrorism is 
a communicative act because it ‘instrumentalises its victims …and the victims of 
terrorism are chosen for symbolic reasons. (Jackson, 2008: 29). 
 
As a form of political communication, terrorism depends on the media for the 
magnification of violent acts. Thus, terrorists depend on the media for their own 
communicative purposes (Crelinsten, 1989). Brigitte Nacos argues that people who 
commit political violence ‘understand their deeds as a means to win media attention 
and news coverage for their actions, their grievances, and their political ends’ 
(Nacos, 2002:10). To Schmid and de Graaf, immediate victims of terrorism are 
‘merely instrumental, the skin of a drum beaten to achieve a calculated impact on a 
wider audience. As such, an act of terrorism is in reality an act of communication’ (as 
cited by Nacos, 2002: 10). It is in this context that L. John Martin argues that 
terrorists exploit the media for tactical and strategic goals to gain publicity for their 
actions (Martin, 2008).  
 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the definition of act of terrorism as outlined by 
the Nigerian Terrorism Act leans more towards crime and this is reflected in some of 
the labels used in the framing of the group in the Nigeria press. It is clear that the 
labels used by key political actors in their description of Boko Haram are indicative of 
the interplay of power in the sense that the tags were capable of influencing public 
perception. It is interesting to note that the military and the federal government used 
‘terrorists’ and ‘insurgents’ labels to identify Boko Haram members. Hoffman argues 
that the word ‘terrorism’ is a pejorative term. Moreover, ‘it is a word with intrinsically 
negative connotations that is generally applied to one’s enemies and opponents, or 
those with whom one disagrees and would otherwise prefer to ignore’ (Hoffman, 
2006:23). Brian Jenkins has observed that the ‘use of the term implies a moral 
judgement; and if one party can successfully attach the label terrorist to its opponent, 
then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint’ (Jenkins, 1975, 
as cited by Hoffman, 2006: 23). 
 
The use of the contested labels did not associate Boko Haram with radical Islam, a 
cause that the group uses to justify its existence and activities. Moreover, the use of 
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these labels legitimised actions taken to contain the group.  For instance, in a Daily 
Trust article, Brigadier General Sani Usman, the Nigerian Army spokesman, warned 
communities in the northeast region of the country against colluding with ‘terrorists’, 
as he called members of Boko Haram, and warned that it was ‘a grievous mistake 
and criminal offence to continue to shield or harbour any known Boko Haram terrorist 
in their midst (Mutum, 2017, p. 3).  The success of the military in containing the 
group was highlighted by political actors in the federal government category as 
represented by a senior special assistant to the president, who noted the: 
 
Concrete achievements of the Buhari administration in the past two or so 
years, including the undeniable fact that the Boko Haram terrorists have been 
significantly crippled militarily, because they no longer have the capability to 
invade and occupy towns and villages unchallenged by the country’s 
reinvigorated and motivated military personnel, (Wakill, 2017, p. 3). 
 
Similarly, Yusuph Olaniyonu, Special Adviser on Media Publicity to the Senate 
President, in a statement marking the 2017 new year’s celebration, described Boko 
Haram as insurgents: “It is a thing of joy to celebrate the New Year in an atmosphere 
of peace and security.  For one thing, the people of the Northeast and indeed across 
the country are celebrating without fear of attacks from insurgents …. (Egulefu, Agba 
& Nda-Isaisah, 2017, p. 6). 
 
While the labels used by the military and the federal government distanced Boko 
Haram from Islam, international organisations, including news agencies, used two 
labels that clearly located the group within the Islamic milieu. The two related labels 
in use were “Islamists” and “jihadists”.  These labels are unequivocally ideological.  
In a story published in The Guardian on January 1, 2017, the newspaper described a 
terrorist attack as bearing ‘the hallmark of Boko Haram Islamists who are notorious 
for using suicide bombers, mostly women and young girls, in attacking civilian 
targets…. Saturday’s attack came a week after Nigerian President Muhammadu 
Buhari said the jihadist group had been routed from Sambisa forest, its last 
stronghold in Borno state (AFP, 2017, para. 4 & 13).   In another instance, following 
an accidental bombing of a camp for internally displaced people, the Médecins Sans 
Frontières (MSF) criticised the military for ‘a botched air strike on Boko Haram 
Islamists in Nigeria that killed at least 52 civilians’ (AFP, 2017, para. 1). The 
organisation described the far north of Borno state, where the camp was located as 
the epicentre of the jihadists’ insurgency (AFP, 2017, para. 3). The labels 
contradicted the official understanding of terrorism in Nigeria and illustrated how the 
international organisations applied a Western framework of meaning to the situation. 
 
For the non-partisan/religious figures, the labels commonly used were remarkably 
different but similar in the nuances. To a Muslim leader, members of Boko Haram 
were “satanic elements” who in 2009 started ‘devilish attacks’ which led some people 
to believe that they were ‘Muslims waging war against the Christians’. This view also 
distanced the group from its Islamic root but located it within broader context of evil. 
In contrast, a Christian leader described Boko Haram’s attacks on the church in 
Nigeria as:   
 
A systematic genocide and persecution through the instrumentality of the 
Islamic fundamentalist sect, Boko Haram, leading to the killing of thousands of 
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Christians and destruction of hundreds of churches, and over 50,000 houses, 
the current unprecedented onslaught against Christians in Southern Kaduna 
by the Islamic fundamentalists disguising as Fulani herdsmen under the watch 
of the Kaduna State Governor, Mallam Nasir el-Rufai, and President 
Muhammadu Buhari has reached an alarming stage. (Olokor, 2017:12.  The 
Punch).  
  
Similar to the international organisations, the Christian community associated Boko 
Haram with Islamic ideology.  
 
The discussion so far illustrates how the media play a critical role in the discursive 
practices that results in labels. As Richard Jackson notes, ‘although acts of violence 
are experienced as brute facts, the wider cultural-political meaning of those acts as 
‘terrorism’ for example, is decided through symbolic labelling, social agreement and 
a range of intersubjective practices’ (Jackson, 2008: 27). The labels identified in this 
study conveyed a particular understanding of the Boko Haram problem. The labels 
either connected Boko Haram to Islam or distanced it from its ideological foundation. 
Framing Boko Haram’s activities as crime distanced the group from its ideological 
roots. Furthermore, the use of profit-driven labels implied that members of Boko 
Haram were driven by economic deprivation to engage in acts of terrorism. Adopting 
a militarised counterinsurgency approach was therefore inappropriate. This view was 
evident in an editorial in Leadership in which the paper alluded that the government 
was wasting money on rehabilitation and deradicalisation in its fight against ‘the 
rampaging marauders called Boko Haram’ (Leadership editorial, 2017, p. 3). 
 
As noted earlier, newspapers published in the southern hub used labels that aligned 
Boko Haram with its Islamic roots. The Guardian identified it as jihadist group while 
The Punch labelled it Islamist. The lexical choices of these two newspapers illustrate 
the intersubjective journalistic practice of using condensational symbols to convey 
messages. In this case, the discursive practices in use reflect socio-political and geo-
ethno cleavages in Nigerian politics. The labels reflect political and ethnic 
frameworks of meanings. Leadership, a newspaper identified with the north, the 
heartland of the Moslem faith, distanced Boko Haram from Islam while The Guardian 
and The Punch, which are published in the south, reinforced the ideological 
connection. Framing members of Boko Haram as Islamic fundamentalists reveal 
ethno-political divides embedded in Nigerian politics and regional media practices.  
The labelling of Boko Haram as a jihadist/Islamist organisation transcends editorial 
choices, it is an expression of moral judgment.  
 
On a more general note, the selection of labels used to frame Boko Haram point to a 
disconnect between key political actors and voices in the terrorism discourse in 
Nigeria. The contradictions in the application of the labels distort public perception 
and probably undermines effort to tackle it because of a lack of shared 
understanding of the Boko Haram problem. 
 
Conclusion 
This study explored the politics of labelling in the construction of narratives about 
Boko Haram in four Nigerian national newspapers. It identified key political actors 
and the different labels the actors use to frame the group in newspaper reports. The 
interpretative framework used by self-validating political actors and the newspapers 
13 
 
underscore a particular understanding of the group. It was clear that some labels 
obscured or demystified the underlying causes of the Boko Haram problem while 
some justified policies and actions taken against Boko Haram. Some of the labels 
diverted attention from critical issues associated with Boko Haram, for example, 
corruption, because fighting ‘terrorism’ has become an economic problem and an 
enterprise with a big price tag. The federal government, for example, claims that 
about 20% of the annual budget is expended on security (Elden, 2014). 
 
The use of ‘criminal’ label was a denial of the political and religious dimensions of 
Boko Haram. Viewed only from an economic deprivation perspective, Boko Haram 
would be like any other insurgent and self-determination group. While the economic 
hardship in northern Nigeria could have created a conducive environment for 
grievance, leaders of the group have exploited the situation to push for a religious 
agenda. The use of the criminal label can, therefore, be seen as a deliberate 
rejection of the values and ideology associated with the group. Beyond the denial of 
ideological foundation of Boko Haram, the use of the ‘criminal’ label also suggested 
a rejection of reality. Boko Haram is not a typical criminal gang, it is a group that 
utilises violence to communicate its message. While criminals may use violence as a 
tool, their motivation is always self-centred and for personal gain. ‘Moreover, unlike 
terrorism, the ordinary criminal’s violent act is not designed or intended to have 
consequences or create psychological repercussions beyond the act itself…. 
Perhaps most fundamentally, the criminal is not concerned with influencing or 
affecting public opinion; he simply wants to abscond’ with the loot (Hoffman, 
2006:36-37). Besides, unlike a common criminal, a terrorist believes and is 
committed to a cause.  In the case of Boko Haram, the goal is the establishment of a 
Caliphate and implementation of Sharia in northern Nigeria. 
 
The analysis presented here illustrates the extent to which ethno-religious divides 
embedded in Nigerian politics and regional media practices influence the framing of 
a group that poses threat to the stability of the country. This study reinforces the 
contested nature of terrorism and how the media reflect the absence of definitive 
understanding of the concept. It also highlights how journalistic practice of labelling 
reflects political and geo-ethnic cleavages in Nigerian politics and media ecology.  
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